
CAN PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS ENCOURAGE SOCIAL REFORM?

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This paper will consider whether Martin Buber's affirmation of relationships offers a means for people to cooperate in seeking social change. On the one hand, Buber determined that the essence of humanity was in the relationships people formed. On the other hand, he did not think that genuinely mutual relationships could fuel political movements. For Buber, genuine relationships were intensely personal and sharing them caused their quality to deteriorate. Despite the truth of this perspective, it seems there is some connection between the search for self-perfection as Buber described it and wider social reform. Three elements contribute to this thesis. One comes from the way Buber depended on his religious beliefs and his academic studies to direct the Zionist movement toward genuine human community. The second emerges in Buber's personal experiences. The third element comes from experiences of spiritual leaders such as Gandhi whose admirers imitated their commitment to personal perfection and brought about wider social change.

Possible connections between personal relationships and social reforms are important. Many contemporary writers contend that, when teachers and students form caring relationships, learning may improve and schools may help students respond to other people in ethical ways. Nonetheless, this essay will not consider contemporary authors. Instead, it will discuss the views of Martin Buber, who died in 1965. His work is appropriate because contemporary scholars who advance caring as a new ethical theory, such as Nel Noddings, acknowledge the richness of Buber's descriptions of relationships. At the same time, some of those scholars, including Noddings, reject the theological underpinnings of Buber's thoughts. This essay will suggest that those spiritual foundations are essential to the notion of relationships that Buber maintains, as those foundations place relationships beyond the reach of human endeavor.

Buber described two main types of relationships that human beings have in the world. Writing in 1923, Buber entitled the book in which he described them *I and Thou*. This was one of the relationships. The other was *I-It*. Buber places two words in pairs to denote the differences in these relations. The word, *I-Thou*, establishes a world of relation, but the word *I-It* establishes a world of experience. In the world of relation, the connection is a mutual recognition that conveys the entire truth of the person or object without transmitting any particular characteristics. In the world of experience, the person recognizes various attributes about a person or object in ways that enables him or her to describe or use the person or the object. Although the relation, *I-Thou*, seems ideal, it is impossible to maintain. According to Buber,

the melancholy fate of humankind is that every *Thou* will become an *It*. For example, married couples cannot continually view each other as *Thou*. At some points, they see each other as sources of knowledge, of pleasure, or of usefulness. In fact, Buber acknowledges that no one could live entirely in the world of *I-Thou*, but he adds that a person who lives only in the world of *I-It* is not fully human.¹

Although the *I-Thou* is commonplace, many people ignore it. Buber says that the signs of address signaling the coming of real speech surround people every day. There is no special preparation needed to recognize the call. Yet, people may not respond because accepting the fact of mutual existence threatens individual desires. Unfortunately, the refusal to acknowledge the signs of address can become automatic as if armor encases such people shutting them off from fulfilling relationships with other people or things.²

The reason people may resist genuine relationships is because such relationships require a willingness to eschew personal gain. Buber calls this mutuality a form of lofty asceticism because the participants cannot use it. To illustrate the inward nature of mutuality, Buber describes an experience he had on his grandparents' estate when he was eleven years old. As often as possible, he went into a stable where found a grey horse. When he touched the animal, he felt its life beneath his hand. On these occasions, it seemed to Buber that the horse confided himself to him. One day, though, Buber noticed that it felt pleasant to rub the horse's neck. From that moment, Buber's relationship with the horse was broken. Although he went to the stable frequently, the feelings of mutuality never returned when he touched the horse.³

Despite the fact that mutuality cannot have a practical application, Buber builds his idea of community upon it. To explain this point, Buber notes that community happens where people confirm their own humanity by turning toward another person. This does not make them members of a collective or of a group marching toward a common vision. Instead, they become a community of many people facing each other. This contradicts popular conceptions of organization, which change comradeship into a tool to accomplish specific goals. Although cooperation enables a group to assert power, Buber warns that working together on a shared task removes the essence of community because the effort becomes more important than the people doing it. Accordingly, the members of such groups remain strangers to each other despite their close contact in their shared undertakings. In addition, Buber warns that leaders

¹ Martin Buber, *I and Thou*, 2nd ed., trans. Ronald Gregor-Smith (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), 3–18.

² Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man*, trans. Ronald Gregor-Smith (1947; repr., New York: Routledge, 2006), 12–13.

³ *Ibid.*, 27.

cannot engineer a community. Like the experience of mutuality, the call for community is everywhere. All people have to do is to accept it.⁴

HOW DID BUBER ARRIVE AT HIS IDEAS OF RELATIONSHIPS?

Well trained as an academic, Buber combined his philosophic understandings with his experiences to arrive at his definition of relationships. The first was from a close reading of the works of Immanuel Kant. According to Steven T. Katz, when Buber was an adolescent, serious philosophical doubts led him to think about suicide. Upon reading Kant, he found an acceptable way to think about reality, and Kant's model became the basic structure for Buber's *I-Thou*. Katz argues that Buber imitated Kant when he claimed the world was two-fold. For example, Buber's description of the *I-Thou* follows Kant's description of the noumenal reality, experiences of things that appear only in thought, and Buber's description of the *I-It* follows Kant's description of the phenomenal reality, experiences of things that occupy space and exist in time.⁵

The second source of his ideas seems to have been the ways he used his political involvement and academic training to flesh out his ideas of relationships. Born in Vienna in 1878, Buber, at the age of three, went to live on a rural estate with his grandparents, who were dedicated to the Jewish faith. His parents had separated. At the age of eighteen, Buber entered university studies, and in 1899, he joined the Zionist movement. His interest in this movement was the abstract ideals it represented, and he tried to turn Zionism from political concerns to the advancement of Jewish culture when he became editor of a Zionist journal a year later. He enjoyed enough success to found *Judischer Verlag*, a publishing press, and to outline plans for Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Two years later, Buber founded *Der Jude*, a journal devoted to spreading a broad version of Jewish culture.⁶

Buber grew dissatisfied with the cultural concerns his journal spread because they evaded the spiritual understandings that he thought were basic to any reform. At least, this is the view of Daniel Murphy, who argues that Buber turned away from the journal to write his thesis for a doctorate about Christian mystics who used meditation and ecstasy to escape from the world. These mystics offered an alternative perspective to Buber's concern for culture, but Buber found distasteful their tendency to avoid the things of the world. Murphy notes that Buber turned to the stories of Hasidic Jews whose mystic orientations affirmed life. Murphy claimed that as Buber translated the stories of the Hasidim leaders, he came to appreciate how the Hasidim sought to apprehend God's reality within the world that He created.⁷

⁴ Ibid., 35–36.

⁵ Steven T. Katz, "Martin Buber's Epistemology: A Critical Appraisal," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 21, no. 2 (1981): 133–158.

⁶ Daniel Murphy, *Martin Buber's Philosophy of Education* (Worcester, UK: Billing & Sons, 1988), 13–15 and 19–21.

⁷ Ibid., 22–23.

Buber claims an experience was a third source that made him realize how relationships mingled religious insights with everyday events. The event that Buber calls a conversion came as World War I approached. At the time, Buber believed he could divide his life between periods of religious ecstasy and other periods devoted to the everyday business of life. One day, after a period of religious rapture, a young stranger named Mehé visited him. They talked amicably; however, Buber was not open to what he calls genuine dialogue. Sometime after this meeting, Mehé died, and Buber considers Mehé's death as a warning to Buber not to divide his life into periods of religious intensity and periods of everyday occupations. He decided that to fulfill the moral obligation to a life of communion, he had to turn his entire existence into meeting the reality of the world.⁸

Maurice Friedman reports that Buber told him years later that Mehé did not seek philosophical or religious counsel, but he wanted to ask how he could trust existence. Unfortunately, Buber did not apprehend this deeper question. Some commentators claimed that Mehé committed suicide. Friedman writes that Mehé died fighting in World War I and that Buber told him Mehé died without opposing his own death. No matter how Mehé died, Buber took his death as a call to be truly present to every situation.⁹

Another experience that helped Buber realize the importance of genuine dialogue was teaching religion to adults. After the war, Buber began to teach religion with Franz Rosenzweig in the Frankfurt Lehrhaus, a free Jewish House of Learning. Rosenzweig had decided that the school would teach religion by starting with concerns about life and moving toward the doctrines found in the Torah. Buber found that the students in this setting were willing to interrupt lectures to ask questions, and Buber found the resulting dialogue so invigorating that it became a model for living. According to Maurice Friedman, stenographers wrote down the discussions in these classes, and Buber used them for his book, *I and Thou*.¹⁰

Unfortunately, Buber had to leave Germany in 1938 as Nazi oppression increased. He accepted a position teaching social philosophy at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This assignment allowed Buber to use his lectures to expand his own ideas. For example, in an introductory course of lectures, Buber described how other philosophers had considered the essence of humanity. This was the subject of his book, *I and Thou*, and Buber used the lectures to contrast his ideas with those of noted scholars.

The results of those lectures appear in the collection *Between Man and Man*. Beginning with a description of how Kant asked about the wholeness of humankind, Buber notes that Kant offers valuable observations about such aspects of human life as selfishness and honesty. Nonetheless, Buber feels that

⁸ Buber, *Between Man and Man*, 16–17.

⁹ Maurice Friedman, *Martin Buber's Life and Work*, vol. 1, *The Early Years, 1878–1923* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1988), 188–190.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 282–302.

Kant fails to answer his own question: What is man? As he surveys the works of philosophers such as Aristotle, Augustine, and Hegel, it appears to Buber that these philosophers go astray when they consider human beings as complete in themselves or as parts of a larger whole. These tendencies seem to fall between portraying human beings as individuals or as members of some collective such as a social class. Buber claimed both categories were abstractions because human beings did not exist alone or within some mass. For Buber, a human being is fully human when he or she is completely with another human being.¹¹

Although Buber argues that a person's claim to humanity comes from his or her ability to address another person, this address or dialogue is not related to the acquisition of language. Instead, Buber believes that one person addresses another when the two of them form a reality between themselves that is open only to them. Although a human being has to be part of this phenomenon, such moments are not restricted to humankind. They could occur between a person and a plant, an animal, or a stone. Most important, moments of genuine meeting could happen anywhere provided people were open to them and eschewed personal control. For this reason, one could not prepare for such a meeting. For Buber, the realm between people or between a person and another thing is the meeting place of the *I* and the *Thou*.¹²

Buber acknowledges that there are two different forms of relationships that approach mutuality because people perceive each other in these forms. The first is observing. This involves noting the various traits that comprise the person. The second is looking on. In this case, the onlooker has no purpose in mind but waits to see what the other person presents. In both of these relationships, the observer and the onlooker stand apart from other people. This is true as well with the most spiritual type of relationship or what Buber called *I-Thou*. In this relationship, the person becomes aware and recognizes that another person has said something to him or her in a way that the "something" enters his or her own life. It is a form of inner speech that a person could not grasp in an objective way.¹³

Although these different levels of relationships appear as steps toward a fulfillment, Buber does not believe that people can learn to approach mutuality through incremental change in the way a swimmer may slowly enter cool water. For example, while teaching Jewish adults in the Frankfurt Lehrhaus mentioned above, Buber gave an address in 1935 about the difficulties of forming community in schools. Although the teachers wanted to lead the students to appreciate general studies, the students had their own world-views or interests that they pursued. Buber contended that the typical effort was for teachers to find the goal that each group wanted and work toward it. To him, this method was ill conceived because education had to point to the

¹¹ Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man*, 140–240.

¹² *Ibid.*, 241–242.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 10–12.

reality that lay beneath the various world-views or ethnicities. This was a world of human beings and their relations. Buber explained that he did this when he taught literature. He recognized that different people saw different things when they read a text. Buber said that he stayed as close as possible to what he found in the texts. He showed the hidden connections, the rhythmic structure, and the meaning. His hope was that, if he did this faithfully, he could show the students his love for the world and his desire to perceive the world in ways that would expose for the students the working forces in the material that he experienced.¹⁴

Buber made a similar point when he addressed the National Conference of Jewish Teachers of Palestine in 1939. Speaking about the ways education enhanced a sense of community, he claimed that most educators followed mechanical methods to show students how to develop good characters. They tried to have students follow rules or adopt proper habits. Although Buber acknowledged that these were essential aspects of education, he thought it was better for teachers to help students become willing to react to situations from their personal, internal unity. Although following laws or forming habits could start a rebellious child toward self-responsibility, these tools could disguise the necessity of confronting what was new in a situation. To avoid mechanical, habitual reactions, they had to be willing to make mistakes. The effort should be to pull their actions together in ways that allowed for the fluctuations of life. Buber concluded that this approach to character training would lead to community because unified people could open themselves to each other.¹⁵

Buber gave the name “social organization” to this quality of community that depended on people being open to each other. It differed from the political principle of organization, which follows the idea of the collective. For example, a group could adopt regulations to encourage participation, such as freedom of speech, but such rules may encourage individual expression rather than mutual awareness. The reason is that the political principle makes some procedures most important whereas the social principle derives from the relationships among the people. As a result, Buber calls for forms of government that encourage people to live in some communal style.¹⁶

Buber adopted the social principle when he formed a program of adult education in Israel. In 1948, officials in Hebrew University agreed to provide programs for Jews who came to Israel from many different countries. They spoke a variety of languages, lacked any knowledge of Hebrew, and did not understand the Israeli customs or history. Buber wanted experienced teachers and administrators to live with the prospective teachers in small communes. In the school, they spoke only Hebrew, and they used their new language to

¹⁴ Martin Buber, *Pointing the Way: Collected Essays*, ed. and trans. Maurice Friedman (New York: Schocken Books, 1974), 98–101.

¹⁵ Buber, *Between Man and Man*, 132–139.

¹⁶ Maurice Friedman, *Martin Buber's Life and Work*, vol. 3, *The Later Years, 1945–1965* (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1983), 66–69.

discuss all sorts of subjects, many of which related to daily life in a new setting. Buber did not set this program up as a pedagogical model. He realized the best thing a teacher could do was to offer different people opportunities to open themselves to each other.¹⁷

Accordingly, when Buber taught in this adult program, he remained open to the students and to the material, and this proved magnetic. According to one account, when Buber read from the Bible, it seemed as if the prophets entered the room and spoke. Each pupil could interrupt and ask questions, but Buber tried to address the wholeness of the person when he replied. This caused things to move slowly. In a course on the Bible, Buber spent three months discussing the precept to love one's neighbor as one's self. Had Buber tried to control the class, the course would have covered more content, but the lessons would not have asked the students to view other people as they had not seen them before.¹⁸

CAN TEACHING LEAD TO MUTUAL RELATIONSHIPS?

Although Buber wanted education to become a means to transmit the truth of relationships, he came to realize there were no effective means to impart such understandings. In part, Buber's experiences during the 1920s and 1930s reinforced his observation of the futility of trying to engineer dialogue. One of his close associates was Elizabeth Rotten who became active in the New Education Fellowship (NEF). This was the international organization of which the American Progressive Education Association was a part. The NEF began in 1921. As the international body of progressive educators, it claimed John Dewey, Harold Rugg, and Carlton Washburne among the thousands of members. Buber and Rotten helped to found the journal *Das werende Zeitalter* (*Developing Age*) that became an important means of communication for the NEF.¹⁹

For several years, the journal, *Das werende Zeitalter*, printed a statement of purpose that corresponded with Buber's ideas. It called for educators to eschew authoritarianism and use schools to open human beings to the truth of human relationships. It added that such a change would become a political force because it would bring about a genuine national community.²⁰

Many members of NEF thought that art and creative aesthetic activities were important means to establish an education for community. In this spirit, the NEF held a conference devoted to the theme of developing the creative powers of children. It met in 1925 in Heidelberg, Germany and was attended by about 450 participants from over twenty-nine countries. The NEF members believed that art enabled children to express their inner beings. Buber

¹⁷ Ibid., 72–76.

¹⁸ Ibid., 77.

¹⁹ Friedman, *Early Years*, 276–281; William Boyd and Wyatt Rawson, *The Story of the New Education* (London: Heinemann, 1965), 66–73.

²⁰ Friedman, *Early Years*, 279.

addressed this conference, and he warned the NEF members that art was a solitary activity that could lead the children into lives of isolation. Buber claimed the role of the teacher was to enable the children to enter into relations with other people.²¹

When Buber spoke about enabling children to enter into relations with other people, he did not advance fostering peer groups devoted to some activity. This would be what he called a “political order” because the students would form a hierarchy of status preventing mutual awareness. In his 1925 speech, Buber called for dialogical relations in education. He stressed that teachers have to avoid any desire to dominate or to enjoy the students. Although dialogue is some form of mutuality wherein the two sides included each other, Buber distinguished dialogue from empathy, which is one-sided. Nonetheless, Buber realizes that the relationships in a teaching situation are not equal as they are in a friendship. While teachers could experience the pupil being educated as a form of inclusion, the pupil cannot recognize what goes on within the teacher. Despite this limitation, Buber considers teaching to be a dialogic relationship, and this definition enables the educator to overcome the contradiction implicit in self-education. People cannot teach themselves. Consequently, Buber urges teachers to gather into themselves the forces found in a community in which the members are turned toward God. The teacher does this to communicate those same forces to the students.²²

In his speech, Buber made the spiritual foundation of dialogue an essential aspect of the teaching act. When Herbert Read, a prominent NEF member, based a chapter of his book *Education through Art* on Buber’s speech to the NEF, Read omitted any mention of Buber’s views of the spiritual aspect of the teacher’s role. Instead, Read offered a six-page summary of Buber’s speech and a three page discussion tracing similar ideas in the theories of psychologists such as Piaget. When Read came to Buber’s conclusion about teachers gathering in the forces turned toward God, Read translated this requirement as a directive for the teacher to guide the student into the vital currents of society. Although Read acknowledged that Buber urged people to accept the will of God, he defined this acceptance as the ability to recognize patterns in many simultaneous phenomena.²³

Read’s omission of the spiritual foundations of dialogue change dialogue into a skill similar to cooking or tennis. This was not Buber’s notion. For him, dialogue was a gift that required acceptance rather than a set of behaviors people could practice. Maurice Friedman claims that Read wanted the teacher to represent society who taught the students to learn to think in the acceptable manners. Friedman adds that Buber wanted people to confront mystery. That is, Friedman says that Buber wanted people to act as the Jewish

²¹ Boyd and Rawson, *New Education*, 68–72, 80–81, and 173–174.

²² Buber, *Between Man and Man*, 115–121.

²³ Herbert Read, *Education through Art* (New York: Pantheon, 1945), 279–288.

believers who imitate a God they knew in some ways although He remained hidden. According to Friedman, although Buber thinks Jews should follow the human ways visible in the commandments, Friedman believes that Buber thinks Jews can find the secret ways through suffering as did Job. This differs from the Christian view, which to Friedman asks believers to imitate the life of Jesus, a visible God. Buber's approach asks believers to search for hidden aspects.²⁴

By offering this contrast between a Christian and a Jewish approach to creating a moral society, Friedman suggests a way to work around a series of logical problems philosophers found in Buber's ideas. These logical problems appeared when philosophers analyzed Buber's descriptions of mutuality.

According to Steven Katz, quoted above, Buber confronted logical difficulties that were similar to those that Kant faced. For example, Katz points out that when Buber explained the *I-It* relationship, he wrote that the subject, *I*, could understand, assess, or use the object, *It*. According to Katz, this means that time and space play roles in this type of relation. The meeting has a specific duration and it takes place somewhere; however, these conditions do not enter into the *I-Thou* relation. In this case of genuine mutuality, each person has a glimpse of eternity. This suggests to Katz that Buber should not contend that the reality of the meeting is between both people, but a better formulation is *I-Eternal-Thou*. In making this suggestion, Katz turns the relation into a revelation of God. While the notion of a meeting being a revelation may be acceptable, two problems arise when Buber contends that only *I-It* relations involved time and space. According to Katz, one difficulty is that human beings cannot understand meetings that have no duration or location. Another problem is whether space and time have objective reality. If space and time exist only in *I-It* relations, Buber implies that space and time exist as mental appearances. In all, Katz complains that Buber offers a confused explanation of reality.²⁵

Another difficulty that Katz finds is that Buber makes pronouns into abstractions as when Buber says that the *I* could know the *Thou* without recognizing any of the characteristics of the *Thou*. Katz acknowledges that Buber might have thought the pronouns imply relationships between people; however, Katz asks how a husband can distinguish his wife from other women without recognizing her characteristics or the many things he shares with her. At the same time, the *I* of *I-Thou* differs from the *I* of *I-It*; however, Katz cannot find any place where Buber explains what unifies these two *Is*.²⁶

The important point about Katz's criticisms is that Katz implies that there is little reason to devote attention to Buber's notions of relationships. The problem with this criticism is that he is taking Buber's ideas as if they describe

²⁴ Maurice S. Friedman, *Martin Buber's Life and Work*, vol 2., *The Middle Years, 1923–1945* (New York: Dutton, 1983), 23.

²⁵ Katz, "Martin Buber's Epistemology," 133–158.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

a reality that people can analyze. As noted above, Friedman suggests that logical consistency may not be a concern since Buber is asking people to follow a God who is hidden but known in some ways. Friedman suggests that Buber is using a religious model to ask people to prepare for the possible coming of relationships which are known in some ways but hidden in many other ways. Accordingly, people need not worry if they cannot fit everything together.

COULD PEOPLE UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF RELATIONSHIPS
AND CONTROL THEM?

Friedman's suggestions are not unusual. A similar account is found in secular explanations of the ethics of relationships. For example, in her text, *Dialectics of Freedom*, Maxine Greene describes the ideas of women philosophers who believe women have a unique way of knowing and of making moral decisions. Greene complains that these philosophers ignore the need for social reform that would make personal freedom real for everyone. This limits their discussions of communities of care to a few people. Greene includes Nel Noddings in her criticism. Nonetheless, Greene makes an allowance similar to the one that Friedman makes for Buber. She adds that these philosophers focus on relationships and caring in ways that might be considered as reserving an opening in the dialectic where freedom could take a place. Although Greene does not say what such an opening would be, she implies that what appears to be an oversight could be a way to speak about relationships that people cannot fully understand. It is possible to consider Friedman's and Greene's suggestions to mean that Buber and contemporary philosophers writing about caring as an ethic imply that personal fulfillment spreads into social reform in unexpected ways.²⁷

Another answer showing that Buber's ideas of relationships might lead to social change appears in the conclusion of Alasdair MacIntyre's book, *After Virtue*. According to MacIntyre, as the Dark Ages threatened the Roman Empire, people seeking to preserve civility stopped thinking of the moral community as something to reinforce the established empire. MacIntyre explains that these people constructed a new form of community within which the moral life did not depend on the existing social structure. MacIntyre adds that people sensitive to the ways contemporary bureaucracies destroy human relations will have to act similarly. He calls for local forms of community where the virtues can survive.²⁸

It appears that Buber wanted to create such local forms of community because he tried to join teachers together with newly arrived immigrants to build relationships that adapted traditional virtues to the then new state of Israel. Although Buber realized he could not engineer community in these

²⁷ Maxine Greene, *The Dialectic of Freedom* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1988), 85–86.

²⁸ MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, 263.

programs for the immigrants, he seems to have believed some conditions facilitate the appearance of those feelings. Buber's attraction to Zionism and to the state of Israel suggests that Buber may have begun a search for self-perfection, but he soon realized that he could not achieve his vision without including other people with what he calls the social principle of organization.

It is instructive to consider *Gandhi and the Stoics: Modern Experiments on Ancient Values* by Richard Sorabji. In this volume, Sorabji shows how Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi reflected the ideals of the Stoics in that he strove for self-perfection through his intense devotion to strict vegetarianism and to regular exercises such as spinning thread. While these activities were private, Gandhi inspired people to imitate his actions. This gave Gandhi's personal commitments such social significance that a political movement began and led to the independence of India. If Sorabji is correct, the same could be said of Buber and the idea of relationships as a political force.²⁹

CONCLUSION

The question of whether personal relationships can become a force for social reform is related to issues of appropriate pedagogical practices. As noted above in the discussion contrasting political organization with social organization, Buber did not offer a set of practices teachers could follow to build a moral community or a moral classroom; however, he did not consider rules for classroom practices to be unimportant. For Buber, a dependable classroom organization was an essential aspect of education. Nonetheless, he warned that it should not hinder teachers from helping students react to situations from their personal, internal sense of unity.

In the example above, the idea of freedom of speech appears. A rule noticing that everyone has a right to an opinion and they must have an opportunity to express it could suggest that people will respect individuals. Applied mechanically, the rule could have the opposite effect. If everyone has a chance to speak, the rule could mean that empty speech and facile distortions are as valuable as the words of a person trying to meet the new elements in a situation in a way allowing for the unexpected events in life. The task for teachers is to recognize when a student speaks from a sense of a higher unity or integrity. In this way, teachers could lead to forming a classroom climate that facilitates the formation of a community because unified people would open themselves to each other. This could be easy to do. Since relationships are around every person, the sole requirement may be that people need only accept the opportunities.

²⁹ Richard Sorabji, *Gandhi and the Stoics: Modern Experiments on Ancient Values* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012).
